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SYSTEM rERAT
L:ABILITY:

WHAT
HAVE
WE
LEARNED?
by Eric Schlachter, Esq. Cooley Godward LLP

n the early 1980s,
Thomas Tcimpidis
operated a bulletin
board system in Los
Angeles. In 1984,
Tcimpidis was arrested because a user had
posted stolen telephone credit card numbers onto the BBS and
Tcimpidis was charged with the misdemeanor of
"knowingly and willfully" publishing the stolen
numbers. Although the charges were eventually
dropped, his arrest received national press coverage and drew attention to the potential liabilities
faced by sysops for the actions of their users.
Some sysops chose to shut down their system
rather than face this liability.
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We now have accumulated 13 years of experience
regarding the issues faced by sysops for the content they make available on their system. As we
might expect, many issues have been clarified in
the intervening time, while many other issues
have remain unresolved. Although there are
many interesting issues related to sysop liability
for their own actions al,ld statements, the more
difficult and complicated issues arise with respect
to the liability faced by sysops, including
Tcimpidis, for the activities and content of their
users. Few sysops fully appreciate the extent of
their liability for their users' or content provider's
activities. This article focuses on some of the conclusions reached-and issues remaining-with
respect to sysop liability for the statements and
actions of third parties.

LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY ACTIONS
AND CONTENT IS NOT UNPRECEDENTED
It is often assumed that sysop liability for a third
party's actions is somehow unique or unprecedented. In fact, there are a wide variety of legal
situations where one party shares liability for a
third party's actions, many times without any
wrongdoing on the part of the non-acting party.

The following illustrate some situations where a
party is liable for the statements or actions of
third parties:
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• There are numerous situations where the
principle of "vicarious liability" applies.
Vicarious liability means that one party,
regardless of conduct or intent, is liable for
third party conduct. For example, an employer is vicariously liable for its employees' conduct performed in the course of employment.
Therefore, if an employee is required by his or
her job to drive a truck, and the employee
causes personal injuries to a pedestrian, the
employer will be liable for such injuries even
if the employer did nothing wrong. Similarly,
partners in a partnership are vicariously
liable for all partners' actions performed in
the course of the partnership.
• Parents can be liable for the conduct of their
children. Sometimes liability does not accrue
unless the parents were negligent in supervising their children; however, there are circum
stances where the parent will be liable even
if they were not negligent.
• Property owners may be liable for the environmental problems on their property, even if
the problems were caused by a prior owner.
• Closer to the sysop situation, newspapers and
other "publishers" are liable for the content
they publish, even if the content is provided
by third parties. Therefore, if a newspaper
publishes an article written by a free lance
journalist or a news wire service, the newspaper ordinarily will be liable for the harm cre
ated from the article (as discussed above, if
the article were written by a staff reporter, the
newspaper would have been vicariously liable).
Also, copyright law is a "strict liability tort,"
meaning that intent to violate is not a prerequisite to infringement. Therefore, film processors
have been found liable for copyright infringement merely by processing rolls of film delivered
by customers. Furthermore, there is a vicarious
liability doctrine in copyright law which has
held the proprietors of "dance halls" vicariously
liable for the copyright infringements committed by bands that play at the venue.

The above list is certainly not complete, but it illustrates the principle
that there are many existing situations
in a wide variety of legal doctrines
where third parties can create liability
for another. Therefore, perhaps sysop
liability for third party actions and
statements is not unprecedented. Of
course, concluding that such sysop liability is a good thing is a different conclusion altogether.
The body of law relating to sysop liability
continues to grow in an ad hoc fashion as
cases in various disciplines are decided
without cross-reference or integrating
analysis. Therefore, this section discusses
cases on sysop liability for copyright,
defamation and obscenity/pornography. A
brief mention of trademarks is also made.

COPYRIGHT
There have been three United States
cases reported on the issue of sysop liability for copyright infringement committed by their users.

Playboy v. Frena, a 1993 case from a
federal court in Florida, involved a situation where photos from Playboy had been
scanned, digitized and uploaded to a bulletin board system in Florida called Techs
Warehouse. George Frena, the sysop of
Techs Warehouse, was sued by Playboy
for copyright
mark
and unfair

summary
in its favor,
the court can grant
there are no
al issues of fact
dispute.
Frena
argued that there
was a material issue
in dispute, since he
claimed that his users were responsible
for uploading the digitized photos to the
system (although in the court's discussion of trademark infringement, the
court seems to believe that Frena himself had uploaded the photos-although
the court was not permitted to make
this factual determination in response
to a summary judgment motion).
The court granted Playboy's motion for
summary judgment, concluding that
whether Frena or his users had
uploaded the files was irrelevant. The
court concluded that Frena violated
Playboy's right of "distribution," argu-

ing that "[t]here is no dispute that
Defendant Frena supplied a product
containing unauthorized copies of a
copyrighted work. It does not matter
that Defendant Frena claims he did
not make the copies itself." In thinly
worded analysis, the court also concluded that Frena violated Playboy's
right of "public display."
The court concluded its analysis by
reiterating why Frena's assertion that
he did not load the files was irrelevant:
"There is irrefutable evidence of direct
copyright infringement in this case. It
does not matter that Defendant Frena
may have been unaware of the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe
is not needed to find copyright
infringement. Intent or knowledge is
not an element of infringement, and
thus even an innocent infringer is
liable for infringement.. .. "

Sega v. MAPHIA, a case from a federal
court in Northern California, was initially decided in March 1994, closely
after the Frena case. (A subsequent decision is discussed below; the initial decision is referred to as Sega I). In the Sega
case, the defendants ran a bulletin
board system called MAPHIA. Users of
the MAPHIA BBS were able to get Sega
game software which had been removed
from the game cartridges and uploaded
to the BBS. The defendants also sold
"back up units"
designed to allow
users to copy Sega
game cartridges.
In
connection
with sales of such
units, or on a
standalone basis,
defendants would
permit buyers to
download Sega
games from the
BBS. The defendants would also
allow those who
uploaded
Sega
games to the BBS the right to download
other games.
The Sega I court found that the games
had been uploaded to the BBS by users.
The court made no conclusion that the
sysops/defendants had uploaded the
infringing material. Nevertheless, as in
the Frena case, the Sega I court concluded that the defendants had directly
infringed Sega's copyrights.
The Sega I court further concluded that
MAPHIA had contributorily infringed
Sega's copyrights. A contributory
infringer is "one who, with knowledge

of the infringing conduct of another,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another." The defendants could properly be deemed contributory infringers
because they had actively promoted the
BBS as an exchange of copyrighted
material and had encouraged it
through selling and bartering the
rights to make downloads.
The Frena and Sega I conclusion-that
sysops are directly liable for copyright
infringement by their users-has produced widespread criticism, but some policy makers have endorsed the result. The
Clinton Administration appointed a task
force to examine copyright issues in
cyberspace, and in a 1995 ''White Paper,"
the task force endorsed direct liability for
sysops. Some discussions have been had
within Congress to implement this
endorsement legislatively. Also, at the
World Intellectual Property Organization
meetings in December 1996 in Geneva, a
worldwide treaty was proposed (and
rejected) that would make sysops directly
liable for copyright infringement.
In December 1996, the Sega court rendered a second ruling that clarified the
first ruling. Based in part on the Netcom
decision (discussed in the next paragraph), the Sega II court concluded that
since the sysop did not upload the
games to the BBS, he was not directly
liable for copyright infringement.
However, due to his encouragement of
unauthorized uploads and participation
in the general scheme, he was found
contributorily liable.
The third case involving sysop liability
for copyright infringement is Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom, an
opinion issued by a federal court in
Northern California. The Netcom case
involved potential liability for an
infringing USENET posting made by a
user. The user, Dennis Erlich, was a subscriber of a North Hollywood BBS called
Support. com operated by defendant Tom
Klemesrud, who used Netcom as the
BBS's Internet service provider.
Erlich posted a message containing the
copyrighted material of the Religious
Technology Center, which is an entity
associated with the Church of
Scientology. The message was sent by
Klemesrud's BBS to Netcom's servers,
which forwarded the message on to
other USENET servers and made the
posting available to Netcom's subscribers. Plaintiffs contacted the defendants and asked them to take various
steps, including the removal of the posting from the USE NET servers. Most of
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the plaintiff's requests were denied, and
Erlich's posting remained on Netcom's
USENET server until it was deleted in
the ordinary course of purging old
USENET po stings 11 days later.
The Religious Technology Center sued
Erlich, Klemesrud and N etcom under a
number of theories, including copyright infringement. In an opinion
issued in late 1995, the court dealt
with Netcom's and Klemesrud's liability for copyright infringement.
The court found that Netcom and
Klemesrud were not liable for direct
infringement of the Scientology texts by
forwarding the work to other USENET
servers and by displaying the work to
USENET readers on their services.
Although their servers made copies of
the materials, neither Netcom nor
Klemesrud had done nothing volitionally: "Only the subscriber should be liable
for causing the distribution of plaintiff's
work, as the contributing actions of the
BBS provider are automatic and indiscriminate." Further, if the court did find
Netcom or Klemesrud liable as a direct
infringer, then USENET would necessarily be shut down because each server
would be directly infringing-a result
the court did not think was necessary:
"The court does not find workable a theory of infringement that would find the
entire Internet liable for activities that
cannot reasonably be deterred."
In refusing to hold Netcom and
Klemesrud directly liable for copyright
infringement, the Netcom court declined
to follow the results reached in Frena
and Sega I holding the sysops directly
liable for their users' actions.
With respect to contributory infringement, the court noted that Netcom and
Klemesrud were given notice of the existence of infringing material before the
posting was automatically flushed. As a
matter of law, the court concluded that
"[w]here a [sysop] cannot reasonably
verify a claim of infringement, either
because of a possible fair use defense,
the lack of copyright notices on the copy,
or the copyright holder's failure to provide the necessary documentation to
show that there is a likely infringement,
the operator's lack of knowledge will be
found reasonable and there will be no
liability for contributory infringement
for allowing the continued distribution
of the works on its system." By implication, therefore, if the sysop receives a
valid and adequate notice of copyright
infringement occurring on its servers
and fails to act, the sysop could be contributorily liable. The court reserved the
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issue of whether or not Netcom and
Klemesrud had sufficient notice for further argument by the parties.

Fall of 1996 Klemesrud settled for
$50,000 and Netcom settled under a
cloak of confidentiality.

The court also addressed whether
Netcom should be "vicariously" liable for
Erlich's behavior. In copyright law, vicarious liability accrues when a party
has sufficient "right and ability to control" behavior and receives a direct
financial benefit from the behavior.
Although the court could not make a
factual determination about N etcom's
right and ability to control Erlich, the
court found that Netcom did not directly benefit financially from Erlich and
therefore was not liable. (Klemesrud's
vicarious liability was not thoroughly
addressed because of a procedural error
made by the plaintiffs.)

Finally, an international copyright case is
worth mentioning. In the case
Scientology v. Providers, a decision rendered by the District Court of the Hague
in March 1996, the Church of Scientology
sued 22 Internet service providers (ISPs)
and one Internet user (who had a home
page containing Church of Scientology
material) for copyright infringement and
trade secret misappropriation, seeking
an injunction against further infringement. The claim against the user failed
because the user had already modified
her page to delete some materials and
had retained only those materials that
had been published before (and therefore
were not trade secrets), and the remainder were subject to the Danish equivalent of fair use. As for the ISPs, the court
concluded that the ISPs had no knowledge of what their users do and no ability to influence such actions. Therefore,
"there is no reason to hold them responsible for wrongful acts of users, e.g., copyright infringements by third parties."
However, the court might have reached a
different result if the ISP knew of the
users' actions and further knew they
were unequivocally wrongful.

Finally, the Netcom court addressed
whether Netcom's behavior was excusable under the "fair use" defense. "Fair
use" is a defense to claims of infringement and can be found by analyzing
four factors: the purpose and character
of the use, the nature of copyrighted
work, the amount and substantiality of
the portion taken, and the effect of the
use on the potential market for the work
(all four factors are considered, although
the last is considered the most important). Although N etcom did copy the
entire work in some cases, the court
noted that Netcom only copied the
amount of the work necessary to act as
a USENET node. The court reserved as
a factual matter whether or not
Netcom's use was fair.
The Netcom case was a well-reasoned
case and it tells us a lot about the latest thinking on sysop liability for copyright infringement. Although the case
was not a clear victory for N etcom or
Klemesrud, it is fairly clear that they
were unlikely to face liability for acting as a USENET node. However,
Netcom and Klemesrud were potentially subject to liability because they
were informed that their system contained infringing material and they
failed to act. Even in this case, the
court seemed sympathetic to Netcom's
argument that it should not be forced
to remove infringing material just
because it receives an unsupported
assertion that the material infringes.
Therefore, unlike the Frena and Sega I
cases, which effectively held sysops
strictly liable for any copyright
infringement on their systems, the
Netcom court established some meaningful thresholds on possible sysop liability. For better or worse, we will
never know how the Netcom court
would finally resolve the issues. In the

DEFAMATION
There have been two reported cases in
the United States that have addressed
sysop liability for defamation.
The first case is Cubby v. CompuServe, a 1991 decision from the Federal
district court in New York City. In this
case, CompuServe, an international
online service, contracted with Cameron
Communications for Cameron to manage CompuServe's Journalism Forum.
Cameron in turn contracted with Don
Fitzpatrick Associates for Fitzpatrick to
supply its periodical Rumorville USA to
the Journalism Forum. In addition to
being CompuServe subscribers, Rumorville readers had to contract with
Fitzpatrick for the right to read the periodical. CompuServe's only compensation
related to Rumorville was for the time
its users spent online reading
Rumorville. It received no share of the
subscriptions paid to Fitzpatrick nor
made a separate subscription or access
fee charge to readers.
In 1990, Rumorville USA published some
statements that the plaintiffs alleged
were defamatory, and the plaintiffs sued
CompuServe and Fitzpatrick for libel,
business disparagement and unfair competition. In the case, CompuServe asked

for the court to dismiss CompuServe from
further proceedings.
At issue is whether CompuServe was a
"publisher" of Rumorville or a "distributor" of Rumorville. The law accords special protection to distributors, because to
impose excessive liability on them would
force them to review all content they distribute, which is an impermissibly heavy
burden under the First Amendment. The
court concluded that "CompuServe ... is
in essence an electronic, for-profit library
. .." and noted that once CompuServe (or,
in this case, its independent contractor)
decides to carry a publication, it will
exercise little editorial control over the
contents of that publication.
Therefore, CompuServe could be liable
for the contents of Rumorville only if it
knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory statements. Since
CompuServe did not review the contents of Rumorville before it was published, and did not otherwise have any
reason to know of defamatory statements in Rumorville, CompuServe was
not liable for Rumorville's statements.
The court also rejected vicarious liability on CompuServe's part for the actions
of Cameron and Fitzpatrick, noting that
CompuServe had delegated manage-

ment of the Journalism Forum to
Cameron. The court rejected arguments
that CompuServe's requirement that
Cameron manage the forum in accordance with CompuServe's standards,
CompuServe's training of Cameron and
the indemnity from CompuServe to
Cameron were sufficient to give
CompuServe control over Cameron.
For many years lawyers and industry
members believed that the Cubby case
was the definitive statement regarding sysop liability for the statements
or actions of its users. Indeed, until
the Frena case, Cubby was the only
reported case on the subject. Furthermore, the standard articulated in
Cubby-that CompuServe was liable
only if it knew or had reason to know
of the allegedly defamatory statement-provided a reasonably welldefined, relatively high threshold for
insulating sysops from liability.
Thus, the industry received a rude
shock from Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy, a decision handed down by the
New York Supreme Court (the lowest
court in New York) in May 1995. The
case involved postings to Prodigy's
Money Talk forum that allegedly
defamed Stratton Oakmont and its

president. These postings were made
from an inactive account held by a former employee, and therefore the poster
was effectively anonymous. Again, the
issue was whether Prodigy was a "publisher" of the statements and therefore
subject to a higher standards of potentialliability for defamation.
Throughout the early 1990s, Prodigy
had aggressively marketed itself as
the family-oriented online service. In
particular, Prodigy had claimed to
exercise editorial control over its content and had repeatedly analogized
itself to a newspaper. To accomplish
its objectives, at one time Prodigy
had deployed dozens of employees to
prescreen and review every public
posting. Prodigy also used a number
of techniques to control the content
made publicly available on its service: using software that prescreened for a proscribed list of
words; promulgating user guidelines which prohibited messages
that were insulting, repugnant to
the community, or harmful to a harmonious community; using "Board
Leaders" to enforce these guidelines; and making available technical tools for Board Leaders to delete
offensive messages.
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The court concluded that Prodigy was a
publisher as a matter of law, and therefore subject to liability for defamation as
a publisher, for two primary reasons.
First, Prodigy had held itself out as
exercising editorial control. Second, the
use of prescreening software and Board
Leaders to enforce subjective guidelines
meant that Prodigy was making decisions about content.
Furthermore, the court held that the
Money Talk forum's Board Leader was an
agent of Prodigy, and therefore Prodigy
was vicariously liable for the Board
Leader's actions. Despite rather clear language in Prodigy's agreement with the
Board Leaders disclaiming an agency
relationship, the court found that by
requiring the Board Leaders to enforce
Prodigy's guidelines and by requiring
Board Leaders to seek guidance from
Prodigy, Prodigy had "managed" the
Board Leaders such that they were considered agents as a matter of law.
The Stratton Oakmont case was widely
criticized when it was issued, in part
because of the sweeping implications of
the court's ruling and in part because of
its inability to be easily reconciled with
the Cubby case. Indeed, by 1994 (the
time of the po stings at issue in Stratton
Oakmont), Prodigy was no longer
attempting to control the content on its
system in a meaningfully different way
than was AOL or CompuServe.
However, there is no doubt that the
Stratton Oak-mont result can be
explained in part by Prodigy's very public
assertions in the early 1990s about its
exercise of editorial control-assertions

that came back to haunt Prodigy
(although the case ultimately settled
without Prodigy having to pay any money
to Stratton Oakmont).
As discussed below, the Stratton
Oakmont case may no longer be good law.
However, a few lessons can still be
learned from it. First, any marketing
campaign must be carefully considered
in the context ofthe legal environment in
which the company operates. Prodigy
may very well have been able to persuade
the judge to follow the Cubby reasoning if
Prodigy did not have all of its declarations from years past to explain away.
Second, although manipulation of user
content is necessarily required in the
process of making it publicly available,
the more manipulation
the
more than a
logically-chall
judge might "Ull"'l~":;
it to be a form of
torial control.
fore, despite the
advantages to
matic word fil
port a claim of
ial control and
fore should be
advisedly. Third,
agreements regarding the posting of content should be drafted
extremely carefully, so that "subjective"
standards are minimized. Typically, a
clause requiring users not to make any
illegal po stings is sufficient to restrict
most noxious conduct-without creating
the opportunity for the sysop to be perceived as applying "subjective" standards
that look like editorial control.

OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
Although there have been many cases
involving sysop liability for obscene or
pornographic material, none of these
cases have involved sysop liability for
user po stings.
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However, the Communications Decency
Act (CDA), a portion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, deals squarely
with sysop liability for "indecent" postings by their users. Gen-erally, the CDA
prohibits users from knowingly sending
content that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent, with intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten or harass" another person or sending content that is
obscene or indecent knowing that the
recipient is under 18. The CDA also prohibits knowingly sending or displaying
content to persons under 18 any content
that, in context, depicts or describes, in

terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.
In both cases, individuals who knowingly permit any "telecommunications facility" under their control to be used for
such activities, with the intent that the
facilities be used for such activities, are
also liable.
There are many defenses described in the
CDA, and mapping out the contours of
these defenses is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, in many cases such
analysis is currently moot-almost all of
the operative provisions of the CDA have
been enjoined in the much-heralded case
ACLU v. Reno. The ACLU case is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court, and a ruling
is expected in mid1997.
Nevertheless, one
defense enumerated
in the CDA is particularly important:
"No provider or user
of an interactive
computer service
shall be treated as
the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by
another information
content provider."
The legislative history on this provision
says "[o]ne of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers as publishers or speakers of content that is not
their own because they have restricted
access to objectionable material."
This section raises as many questions as
it answers. On its face, it appears to
negate many forms of sysop liability for
third party actions or statements,
resolving many of the ambiguities discussed in this paper. On the other hand,
there are several questions:
Will courts give effect to this provision if
the remainder of the operative provisions of the CDA are permanently
struck down as unconstitutional?
Will courts give effect to this provision if
the sysop is not trying to restrict access
to objectionable materials but is merely
exercising a more general form of editorial control?
Will this language be extended to cover
sysop liability for copyright infringement, which does not use the term "publisher" or "speaker" but instead uses the

terms "reproduce," "distribute," and
"publicly display"?

TRADEMARKS
The Frena and Sega cases both
addressed sysop liability for trademark
infringement. However, in both cases the
sysop was the party taking the actions
resulting in trademark in-fringement. In
Fre-na's case, Frena had inserted his own
proprietary rights no-tices into the GIFs;
in the Sega case, the sysop had developed
ftle descriptions and hierarchies which
used Sega's trademarks. Therefore, these
cases contribute little to our understanding of sysop liability for third party trademark infringement.
However, a decision somewhat relevant to
this topic was reached in Panavision v.
Toeppen in a decision reached in November 1996 in a federal district court in
Los Angeles. In the case, the domain
name registry Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI) was sued for negligent interference
with prospective economic advantage for
giving the domain names panavision.com
and panaflex.com (both of which are registered trademarks owned by Panavision) to Dennis Toeppen, a notorious
domain name hijacker. The tort of for negligent interference with prospective eco-

nomic advantage is a relatively nebulous
one and therefore courts are reluctant to
extend liability too far-defendants must
have a "special relationship" with plaintiffs in order to be liable. The Panavision
court ruled that such a special relationship did not exist between NSI and
Panavision. NSI did not know that
Toeppen's actions were intended to interfere with Panavision's rights, and ''NSI is
under no general duty to investigate
whether a given registration is improper." Although this language is contextspecific to the general duties of registries for negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage, the
reasoning of the case might apply to
insulate sysops for trademark infringements committed by their users.

SO WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

In the midst of the confusion, however,
one phrase comes up repeatedly: Did the
sysop "know or have reason to know" of
the harmful conduct? This standard
requires that the sysop had actual
knowledge or deliberately ignored the
problem before imposing liability on the
sysop. On the other hand, it does give
harmed third parties, like copyright
owners or defamed parties, the opportunity to limit their harm by forcing action
when the sysop is informed of a problem. This solution avoids a legal regime
of liability so chilling as to drive sysops
out of the business, without permitting
anarchy to reign on the Internet.

There are no clear trends about whether
or not we really want sysops to act as
the guarantor for the harms caused by
their users. The Frena, Sega I and
Stratton Oakmont cases very liberally
imposed liability on sysops. Other cases,
such as Netcom and Cubby, have imposed significant hurdles on finding
sysops liable. The legislative trends
have been no more clear. The rumblings
made in congress and at the WIPO con-

Nevertheless, there is no promise that
the rules to be developed regarding
sysop liability will strike any balance at
all. As more cases are decided by judges
who do not understand the technology,
and as more sweeping and broad legislation is introduced by legislators who
do not understand the technology, the
only predictable results are chaos, confusion and long battles to preserve the
emerging cyberspace industry. +
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ference toward increased sysop liability
are ominous. But the CDA, roundly criticized as a horrendous law, seems to
absolve sysops for many types of liability.
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